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DISESTABLISHMENT WITHOUT
IMPARTIALITY: A CASE-STUDY
EXAMINATION OF THE RELIGIOUS
CLAUSES IN THE NIGERIAN
CONSTITUTION
SIMEON 0. ILESANMIt
INTRODUCTION
Since its existence as a territorial unit of the international
community, Nigeria has wrestled with the challenge of the
perceived dissonance between its avowed political and legal
norms and their equitable application to the diverse and
competing spheres of culture and society. With its origin as a
modern nation-state in the arbitrary colonial amalgamation of
socially disparate and culturally unaffiliated peoples, it has
sought to define a new cultural identity through constitutional
and democratic avenues, which would prevent the state from
indentifying with any one of the cultural segments within it.
Even during the intermittent interregna of military regimes, a
semblance of constitutionalism was always maintained by
promulgating edicts and co-opting judicial functionaries so as to
douse, even if unsuccessful, the impression that military rule is
irreconcilable with the rule of law. Notwithstanding the abysmal
performance of its rulers, past and present, the belief remains
strong among Nigeria's citizens that the country's political and
economic renaissance lies in an unyielding commitment and
genuine fidelity to democratic values anchored in constitutional
practice. The Preamble to the 1999 Constitution, not unlike its
predecessors, boldly declares the constitution as the supreme law
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Honors, University of Ife. Simeon 0. Ilesanmi is the Washington M. Wingate
Professor of Religion at Wake Forest University where he teaches about and writes
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of the land and its provisions as having "binding force on the
authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of
Nigeria."' Moreover, contrary to popular belief, these modernist
sentiments did not derive from the colonial transplantation of
European Enlightenment philosophy nor are they dysfunctional
imitations of Western constitutional orders; rather, they are
partly rooted in the endogamous triple religious heritage of the
country'-Islam, Christianity, and traditional religion-whose
adherents, according to one scholar, "are hard to distinguish with
regard to [the subject ofl democracy."3
Yet, the relationship between religion and the Nigerian state
remains, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, ominous. Arguably
the fastest growing industry in the country, religion has also
"always formed a shadow over the Nigerian federation, and has,
since May 1999, not only formed a darker shadow over the polity,
but even threatened to eclipse it."4 Muslims, Christians, and
adherents of the traditional religions are divided over the limits,
if any, that should be imposed on their freedom and the scope of
responsibility they should have in shaping political life, broadly
construed. Their disagreement remains the single most
important issue in Nigeria's post-colonial history and is rendered
more complex by other streams of pluralism that are latent in the
country, including ethnicity, class, and region. In addition, the
absence of common symbols of discourse-deriving from the
indigenous traditions with which to think and speak as Nigerians
about the meaning of political reality and responsibility-coupled
with the frequent eruption of civil tumults in the country,
complicate the task of articulating an account of the proper
relation between religion and the state.'
The coalescence of these conflicting signals-on the one
hand, a commitment to the rule of law and, on the other, the
'CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), §1(1), available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
2 See generally OLIJF MI TAfw(, How COLONIALISM PREEMPTED MODERNITY IN
AFRICA (2010).
' Michael Bratton, Briefing: Islam, Democracy and Public Opinion in Africa, 102
AFR. AFF. 493, 495 (2003).
4 J. Isawa Elaigwu & Habu Galadima, The Shadow of Sharia Over Nigerian
Federalism, 33 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 123, 123 (2003).
6 See Ebenezer Obadare, In Search of a Public Sphere: The Fundamentalist
Challenge to Civil Society in Nigeria, 38 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 178, 178-97
(2004).
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"divergent epistemic notions of democracy that are disputed on
cultural grounds"6-creates the need to reexamine the integrity
of Nigeria's evolving experiment regarding the constitutional
status of religion. It is not enough that a country declares an
adherence to a constitution, written or unwritten; it is also
necessary to inquire about the motivational rationale behind that
commitment. As Richard Joseph rightly observes, "[mlany
contemporary dictatorships have constitutions which serve more
to camouflage the exercise of power than to guide and determine
it."' Ernst Troeltsch has suggested that any regulative policy of
the state regarding its official position on religion must be guided
by "the inner position of society vis-A-vis the religious life
generally." David Martin specifies this principle more clearly as
referring to the structural relationships between religion and
society-that is, the number and variety of religious confessions
in a society, on the one hand, and the degree to which that
circumstance is, as a matter of degree, rigid or flexible, on the
other.9
A central argument of this Article is that the motivational
rationale behind the current constitutional definitions of religion
in Nigeria lies in the wide acknowledgment of the normative
importance of the country's contextual plurality. To the extent
that this is true, Nigeria can be said to have distinguished itself
from other similarly situated post-colonial states that opted for a
different constitutional direction. In order to avoid the charge of
what one scholar characterized as "intra-imperial isomorphism"'o
in their national constitutions, which refers to the act of
imitating and reproducing the putatively secular constitutional
models of the former colonizing powers-countries such as
Pakistan, Malaysia, Tunisia, among others, "either: (a) explicitly
name a specific religion as the official state religion, (b) make
6 Rita Kiki Ediozie, Democratization in Multi-Religious Contexts: Amina vs. The
(Disunited) States of Nigeria, in KAMARI MAXINE CLARKE, LOCAL PRACTICES,
GLOBAL CONTROVERSIES: ISLAM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN CONTEXTS 145, 146
(2006).
' R.A. Joseph, National Objectives and Public Accountability: An Analysis of the
Draft Constitution, in ISSUES IN THE NIGERIAN DRAFT CONSTITUTION 1, 1
(Suleimanu Kumo & Abubakar Aliyu eds., 1977).
8 ERNST TROELTSCH, RELIGION IN HISTORY 109 (James Luther Adams & Walter
F. Bense trans., 1991).
9 DAVID MARTIN, A GENERAL THEORY OF SECULARIZATION 18-19, 23-25 (1978).
"0 Julian Go, Modeling the State: Postcolonial Constitutions in Asia and Africa,
39 SE. ASIAN STUD. 558, 559 (2002).
547
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
reference to a specific religion as providing certain legal
principles, (c) have some kind of provisions that directly elevate a
particular religion or (d) have some combination of these."n
However, in so doing, these countries undermined the process by
which a sociologically diverse society can become a democratic,
pluralist polity.12
Generally speaking, "a pluralistic polity is one in which the
collectivity is divisible along the axes of self and other, whether
in terms of recognition of ethnic, cultural or religious differences,
or of an individualism revolving around a multiplicity of values
and objectives."' 3 Of pluralism and constitutional government "in
our time, it can be said that, like love and marriage in an old
sweet song, 'you cannot have one without the other.' "14 In the
absence of some kind of pluralism, modem constitutionalism
would make little, if any, sense. Their interdependence is a
reflection of their common association with certain normative
presuppositions from which they derive their valence and
identity.
These include the idea of the legal subject, the inviolability
without due process of the sovereignty of the subject, the
separation of powers in the state, the presumption of innocence
and the impartiality of the operators of the system, and the
necessity for the judiciary to remain an arbiter between the
powerless individual and the all-powerful state.'5
In short, pluralism is the primary reason for embracing
constitutionalism and the end which this ideal is intended to
serve.
[I]n a completely homogenous society, with a commonly shared
secular or religious conception of the good, constitutionalism
n Id. at 565.
2 As explained by Abdullahi An-Na'im, "the phenomenon of diversity is a
permanent feature of all human societies everywhere, manifested in different forms
and dynamics among them over time.... [But] pluralism is an ideology and system
that accepts diversity as a positive value and facilitates constant negotiations and
adjustments among varieties of difference without seeking or expecting to terminate
any or all of them permanently." ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, ISLAM AND THE
SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI'A 225 (2008).
13 Michel Rosenfeld, A Pluralist Critique of the Constitutional Treatment of
Religion, in THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: MODELS FOR POST-COMMUNISM 39,
44 (Andrds Saj6 & Shlomo Avineri eds., 1999).
" Richard L Sklar, On the Study of Constitutional Government in Africa, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND SOCIETY IN AFRICA 43, 43-54 (Okon Akiba ed., 2004).
" TAfWO, supra note 2, at 3.
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would be superfluous, as the governors would be identified with
the governed, the law makers with those subject to laws, and as
the organically cohesive polity would delimit a normative realm
relying on duties rather than rights.16
However, the linkage between constitutionalism and
pluralism is neither merely conceptual nor accidental; it arose
out of historical experience and judgments about the most
desirable way to handle the phenomenon of difference in human
society. Differences of world views, religious convictions, and
conceptions of the good had been used in the past-as they are
still being used now-as justifications for persecution and
discrimination. Constitutionalism reflects a deep political and
moral orientation, construed in the West as political liberalism,
that a certain set of institutional checks and balances needs to be
created to mitigate the tendency of persons and groups to
unleash evils against others on the basis of identity difference.'
This Article shall characterize this as the negative function of
constitutionalism. There is also its positive function, arising
from the same orientation, which is instantiated in the two
realities that liberalism fosters: "cooperation between persons
and groups of diverse normative persuasions, and the freedom of
the same persons and groups to pursue their normative
agenda."'" Constitutionalism therefore has a dual relationship to
pluralism: On the one hand, the reality and awareness of
plurality or difference prompt a reflection upon how best to curb
its deleterious effects; on the other hand, the response itself is
designed to delimit the scope of pluralism without erasing it.
The current official status of religion in Nigeria seems to
have been guided by these substantive normative and procedural
perspectives on constitutional democracy and its pluralist
inflection.'" It is a complex and arguably ambiguous status,
given the multiple references to religion in the constitution. The
two prominent ones are the Non-Adoption of Religion and the
16 Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 44.
17 See LOUIs HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 1-30 (1978).
1s John Kelsay, Plurality, Pluralism, and Comparative Ethics: A Review Essay,
24 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 403, 418 (1996).
19 Larry Diamond, Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggle for Democracy,
in POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING EXPERIENCES WITH
DEOMCRACY 351-410 (Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, & Seymour Martin Lipset ed.,
2d ed. 1995).
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Free Exercise Clauses in Sections 10 and 38(1), respectively.2 0 In
theory, Nigeria operates a federal system which presupposes a
relative autonomy and interdependence of the national, state,
and local government levels or "a dynamic process of co-operation
and shared action"2 1 among all three; in practice, the country
actually has one national constitution. 22  Accordingly, these
regulative principles apply to both federal and state
governments, thus making unnecessary the device of the doctrine
of incorporation typically used in other jurisdictions to extend the
application of federal law to the states.23
Most commentators have limited their discussion of religion-
state relations in Nigeria to the import of these two provisions
and how they interact with each other.2 4 A standard
interpretation of the Non-Adoption Clause, for example, is that it
confers a secular status on the Nigerian state and restricts
religion to the private realm. 25  This interpretation accords
lexical priority to the non-adoption norm over the free exercise
principle, seeing the institutionalization of secularity as a
precondition for a legitimate exercise and enjoyment of religious
freedom. In his plea for what he calls the "the politics of the
2o Section 10 provides that "[tihe Government of the Federation or of a State
shall not adopt any religion as State Religion," and, according to section 38(1),
"[elvery person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in
community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance." CONSTITUTION OF
NIGERIA (1999), §§ 10, 38(1), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/
ConstitutionOfrheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
21 Ranjit Singh Sarkaria, Foreword to S.C. ARORA, CURRENT ISSUES AND
TRENDS IN CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS: A GLOBAL VIEW, at viii (1991).
22 See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 1(1), available at http//www.nigeria-
law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
23 In the United States, for example, the Bill of Rights, by its express terms,
applies only to the federal government. However, the First Amendment and most of
the remaining amendments in the Bill of Rights apply to state governments today
because of the judicially created doctrine of incorporation. Essentially, the doctrine
incorporates the provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause by declaring that each of the rights was fundamental to the
conception of due process of law. See the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963) for the Supreme Court's explanation of the doctrine,
and for subsequent clarification see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
24 See generally Adigun Agbaje, Travails of the Secular State: Religion, Politics
and the Outlook on Nigeria's Third Republic, 28 J. COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL.
288 (1990).
25 TOYIN FALOLA, VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: THE CRISIS OF RELIGIOUS POLITICS
AND SECULAR IDEOLOGIES 11 (1998).
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public sphere," which "presumes basic secularity and the
relationality of religious truths," Ebenezer Obadare asserts that
Nigeria's goal of becoming "an all-inclusive political community"
would be undermined and its democratic aspirations frustrated if
"polarized religious and ideological persuasions" are not held to
"an integrative social vision."" Similarly, Jibrin Ibrahim calls for
an overlapping consensus among Nigeria's social forces on the
sanctity of "a domain of the profane that cannot be subsumed by
the religious domain, irrespective of the level of religiosity in
question."" One is reminded of a similar argument made by
Philip Kurland, commenting on the relationship between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that the "clauses should be
read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize
religion as a standard for action or inaction because these
clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden.""
On the opposite side are those who contend that attributing
secularity to the Nigerian state, on the basis of Section 10 of the
Constitution, would contravene the free exercise norm, which
guarantees a zone of freedom to every citizen for maximal
expression of their religious or non-religious fundamental
beliefs.2 9 The latter view contends that the logic of secularity
entails certain philosophical assumptions about the relationship
between the individual and the state, the private and the public,
the spiritual and the temporal, which are incompatible with the
orthodoxies of certain religious traditions. 30 The complementary
aim of the Non-Adoption and the Free Exercise Clauses, it is
contended, is to protect freedom of religious beliefs and actions.3'
26 Obadare, supra note 5, at 179.
27 Jibrin Ibrahim, The State and Religion in Nigeria: Forces and Dynamics, 5
AFRIKA ZAMANI (1997).
28 Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 96 (1961).
29 See generally IBRAHEEM SULAIMAN, THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE CHALLENGE
OF HISTORY: IDEAS, POLICIES AND OPERATION OF THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE (1987).
"o See id. at 1-4.
" This argument echoes Justice Brennan, concurring in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963), who argued that "the
Establishment Clause [is] a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious
liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause
alone."
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While the secularists use the metaphor of separation," the
anti-secularists emphasize accommodation, to articulate their
respective visions of the proper relationship between religion and
the Nigerian state." Each side seems entrenched in its position,
and the impasse created by their mutual rigidity has
unfortunately fuelled the impression that "religion is an
anomaly, requiring exotic constitutional treatment different from
anything else."34 They both overlook the fact "that the
Constitution expresses special concern for religion because and to
the extent that religious difference inspires inequality in
stature and reward, and accordingly, that the Constitution's
fundamental religion-specific goal is that of opposing
discrimination."3 5  "Although each view contains an important
partial truth that accounts for its attraction, each . . . fails to
recognize the partial truth in the other view. Each view,
therefore, is inadequate to the task of offering a morally
defensible interpretation of the religion" provisions in the
Nigerian Constitution or providing guidance on how religious
beliefs, practices, and institutions should be properly related to
the Nigerian State.3 6
This Article defends a third view, anchored in the notion of
equal liberty, which it argues is what is envisioned in the non-
discrimination principle found in section 42 of the Constitution,
which provides:
A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group,
place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by
reason only that he is such a person:
(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical
application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any executive or
administrative action of the government, to disabilities or
32 See Agbaje, supra note 24, at 294.
" See SULAIMAN, supra note 29, at 3-4.
34 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND THE CONSTITUTION 17-18 (2007).
* Id. at 9.
3 Amy Gutmann, Religious Freedom and Civic Responsibility, 56 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 907, 907 (1999).
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restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities,
ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions
are not made subject; or
(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical
application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any such executive
or administrative action, any privilege or advantage that is not
accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic
groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions."
Rather than engage in an abstract discussion of the idea of
equal liberty or a sweeping assessment of the goodness of both
religion in general and its optimal role in public life, this Article
focuses on one example of religion-state entanglement that raises
the issue of distributional fairness and underscores the
mediating role of the non-discrimination principle vis-A-vis the
norms of non-adoption and free exercise. Government
involvement in pilgrimage, at both federal and state levels, offers
an opportunity to examine the utility of these principles as
frameworks for handling Nigeria's own burden of democratic
governance. To keen observers of Nigerian affairs, the
pilgrimage issue seems the least likely candidate to test the
practical value of constitutional prescriptions in setting the
proper boundary between the secular and the sacred or to
adjudicate conflicts that routinely erupt between the two
spheres. For over two decades, Nigeria has been engulfed in the
inferno of Shari'ah controversy in all its multiple dimensions, the
most recent of which is the adoption of this religious law by ten
northern Nigerian states and the push by some Muslim
constituencies to extend its influence and application to the
southern part of the country.38 While the furor surrounding the
issue seems to have subsided a bit, no one doubts its possible
eruption at any opportune moment in Nigeria's kaleidoscopic
political milieu." More important, we should want to know why
a characteristically volatile Nigerian political terrain has
experienced minimal, if any, controversy on account of
government sponsorship of pilgrimage-sponsorship that
3 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 42(1), available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
3 M. Ozonnia Ojielo, Human Rights and Shari'ah Justice in Nigeria, 9 Ann.
Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 135-62 (2003).
3 See Ebenezer Obadare, A Crisis of Trust: History, Politics, Religion and the
Polio Controversy in Northern Nigeria, 39 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 265, 268, 280-
81, 284 (2005).
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involves not only huge financial expenditure but also the use of
government resources, including personnel, property, time, and
the unquantifiable imprimatur of the symbolic support of the
state.4 0
The absence of an effective legal channel through which civil
disagreements can be justly resolved is one reason, among many,
that Nigerians have not bothered to challenge the government for
its involvement in what is ostensibly beyond its allotted
responsibility. This does not mean that there are no judges and
lawyers in Nigeria; in fact, the doctrine of separation of powers is
writ large in the country's governmental structures. 41 However,
the judiciary has functioned more like an extension of, and
sometimes a lackey for, the executive and legislative branches
than an independent coequal branch.4 2 While the symbolisms
may be similar, the actual jurisprudential impact of the Supreme
Court of Nigeria has been relatively minimal, compared with the
role such institutions play in other democracies, notably the
United States, where the Supreme Court's decisions have
"directly impacted the way people express themselves religiously
on a daily basis and shaped [their] understanding of what it
means to live in a democracy with substantial religious
diversity."43 But because of the fascist and autocratic tendencies
of Nigerian governments, military and civilian, the nation's high
court has been reluctant to issue authoritative pronouncements
in "most of the leading cases that questioned some of the
established norms of the Nigerian political system."" To have
done so would have meant career suicide, if not literal death, for
the judges concerned. Thus, for guidance on religion
jurisprudence, whether about pilgrimage or other subjects, we
will have to look elsewhere for "the 'lively sparks' that might
41 See National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) (Establishment) Act No.
(9) (2006) 93:66 S.O.G., A330-31 (Nigeria).
4 See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), ch. 5-7, available at http://www.
nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
42 See MOJEED OLUJINMI A. ALABI, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE NIGERIAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 1963-1997, at 2-3, 37 (2002).
4 RONALD B. FLOWERS ET AL., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE SUPREME COURT 2
(2008).
4 ALABI, supra note 42, at 229.
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ordinarily be expected from the judiciary in a complex and highly
segmented nation-state like Nigeria."4 5 These sparks are
analyzed in Part I below.
I. PILGRIMAGE TRADITION IN NIGERIA: AN UNEQUAL RELIGIOUS
REQUIREMENT
Pilgrimage has been described as a journey undertaken by a
person or group of persons to a sacred place as an act of religious
devotion.4 6 It is an integral part of the complex reality of
religious life, existing at the intersection of myths, doctrines, and
ritual. At one level, it resembles such mundane human activities
as tourism, in that "both [pilgrimage and tourism] are born from
a desire to travel, to head into an unknown, foreign place where
one might experience new sights and sounds and tastes and
smells, and ultimately to be corporeally inspired by some
transcendent locale."4 7 However, journeys undertaken for
religious purposes possess certain characteristics that are lacking
in other kinds of peripatetic adventures, including but not
limited to "the existence of [a] sacred place or pilgrimage
center ... [and] the hope of obtaining some material or
spiritual benefits."48 While all three elements-the presumed
supernatural power inherent in the pilgrimage site, the
numinous quality of experiencing a temporary exile, and the
economy of rewards4 9-jointly imbue pilgrimage with a
compelling rationale, its main attraction lies in the construction
and preservation of sacred geography and the impact this has on
the pilgrim's self-understanding and identity.so The notion of
sacred space "implies a hierophany, an opening to the holy or
divine, a place where communication with sacred power is made
possible."" Mircea Eliade, a historian and phenomenologist of
religion, refers to such a place as "axis mundi," the "center of the
4 Id.
46 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL
PRINCIPLES 2210 (Lesley Brown ed., 4th ed. 1993).
4 S. Brent Plate, Introduction: The Varieties of Contemporary Pilgrimage, 59
CROsS CURRENTS 260, 262-65 (2009).
4 Edmund Emefie Ikenga-Metuh, Pilgrimage in African Religion: A Quest for
the Ultimate, 6 DIALOGUE AND ALLIANCE 3, 4 (1992-93).
49 Id. at 3-4.
so Id. at 7-9.
51 JAMES C. LIVINGSTON, ANATOMY OF THE SACRED: AN INTRODUCTION TO
RELIGION 43 (6th ed. 2009).
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world."5 2 It is a point around which, symbolically speaking, the
world rotates.53 Examples of such places include the birthplace,
location of life events, and tomb of a holy person, as well as
natural objects like rivers, mountains, caves, islands, and
strange features of the landscape that are believed to incarnate
the spirit or radiate spiritual magnetism." Moreover, because a
sacred place "represents not only an 'opening' to heaven but also
a reproduction, on the human scale, of the cosmos or of Creation
itself," that is, "an imago mundi, an image of the original world
order,"55 every encounter with it induces expectations of
unparalleled divine favors or even miracles. In short, the
religious quality of a pilgrimage makes it a potentially
transformative journey for those who undertake it.
Every year thousands of Nigerians participate in this kind of
journey. The destinations may vary, but the motivation and
objectives are comparable. The tradition of making a pilgrimage
predates the arrival of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria and
remains an integral part of indigenous cultural life.56  The
shrines of Oshun in the southwestern cities of Oshogbo and
Arochukwu in eastern Nigeria are examples of sacred sites which
annually attract pilgrims seeking different kinds of divine favors
and blessings. The myths and symbols connected with these
shrines are "expressive of the human search for the ultimate.""
Similarly, every Christmas members of the Celestial Church of
Christ, an African initiated denomination, make pilgrimages to
the holy city of Imeko where the Church's founder, Prophet
Oschoffa, was buried." The church's constitution describes
the Christmas pilgrimage as "a 'convocation' of
52 MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION
22, 36 (Willard R. Trask trans., Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 2d ed. 1959) (1957)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
13 See id. at 22.
64 LIVINGSTON, supra note 51, at 43-45.
55 Id. at 44.
56 See generally Peter Probst, Keeping the Goddess Alive: Performing Culture
and Remembering the Past in Osogbo, Nigeria, Soc. ANALYSIS, Apr. 2004, at 33.
" See Jacob K. 01upona, 6rish 6sun: Yoruba Sacred Kingship and Civil
Religion in 6sogbo, Nigeria, in (SUN ACROSS THE WATERS: A YORUBA GODDESS IN
AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS 46, 46-67 (Joseph M. Murphy & Mei-Mei Sanford eds.,
2001); Ikenga-Metuh, supra note 48, at 5-7.
58 Ikenga-Metuh, supra note 48, at 4.
* Andr6 Mary, Pilgrimage to Imeko (Nigeria): An African Church in the Time of
the 'Global Village', 26 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 106, 112-13 (2002).
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members[,] ... ordained by the Holy Spirit," obligatory for
consecrated Evangelists of the church, and undertaken "in
expectation of the blessing of anointment." 0 Prophet Oschoffa
underscored the significance of the choice of this location in a
message he reportedly received in a vision in 1973 and relayed to
his members that "Mecca would be closed, that Jerusalem would
cease to be in its accustomed place, and that God had chosen
Imeko as the New Jerusalem.""1 This is precisely what Imeko
has become, "a sort of Rome or Vatican in the heart of the African
bush,"62 according to one scholar. The same can be said of Oshun
and Arochukwu shrines, all of which signify the attempt to affirm
the possibility of encountering the divine within the geographical
boundary of Nigeria and to demystify the privileged status that
seems to have been ascribed to the birth places of the two so-
called world religions in the country. This attempt at recognizing
the legitimacy of local pilgrimage centers is in consonance with
earlier efforts by theologians and others to develop and prescribe
normative agendas aimed at responding to the socio-cultural and
political contexts and concerns, both spiritual and material, of
Nigerians. 3
However, like much else about Nigeria and perhaps the
whole of Africa, local interests and initiatives have never been
able to completely resist the allure of outside alternatives and
possibilities; in fact, in every instance of competition between the
local and the foreign, it is the latter that tends to dictate the
terms of the engagement, which not only assures its victory but
also perpetuates the pernicious myth of the inherent inferiority
of indigenous worldviews vis-A-vis outside cultural contenders.
Thus, in what would undoubtedly be a disappointment for people
like Prophet Oschoffa, Mecca has not been closed and Jerusalem
remains in its accustomed place. Both locations continue to draw
Nigerian pilgrims and are believed to bestow far greater spiritual
benefits and social prestige than any other recognized local
sacred sites. Constitutionally, it is within the right6" of these
I Id. at 113.
61 Id. at 111.
6 Id. at 112.
63 See generally E. BOLAjI IDOWU, TOWARDS AN INDIGENOUS CHURCH (1965).
6" The two rights implicated here are the freedom of religion and freedom of
movement. On the latter, see the CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999),
§§ 38, 41(1), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederal
RepublicOfNigeria.htm.
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Nigerians to choose any locations, foreign or local, as the places
to fulfill what they understand to be the injunctions of their
faith. What is at issue, then, is not that they prefer Mecca and
Jerusalem or some other holy sites outside of Nigeria to local
options, but that they enlist government support for their
religious journeys. Whether or not such support constitutes an
illicit boundary crossing or a permissible aid intended to remove
a burden impeding the free exercise of religion is a question that
the Nigerian state must confront.
Aside from legal and political considerations, another reason
for addressing this question has to do with the ambiguous
theological status of pilgrimage across the spectrum of religious
traditions, especially the two that are dominant in Nigeria."
Islam and Christianity may share a common Semitic origin, but
their belief systems are defined by radically different doctrinal
content." Islam is organized around five pillars of faith, one of
which is the haj or pilgrimage to Mecca, which every adult
Muslim who is in a position to do so is required to perform at
least once in his or her lifetime. Muslim authorities generally
agree on the following requirements of eligibility for the hajj:
(1) one must be a confessing Muslim who (2) has reached the age
of puberty, (3) is of rational and sound mind, (4) is a freed man or
woman, and (5) has the physical strength and health to
undertake the rigors of the journey." Islamic law also provides
that a pilgrim "must possess sufficient means not only to cover
the expenses of the journey but also to make provision for his
dependents while he is away."6 9  This provision includes the
"payment of school fees for the children and the feeding of the
65 See generally Ian Reader, Pilgrimage Growth in the Modern World: Meanings
and Implications, 37 RELIGION 210 (2007) (discussing how the increase in number of
pilgrimages is not necessarily explained by an increase in religious sentiment).
6 See Li Weijian, Cultures and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, in CULTURAL IMPACT
ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 169, 178-79 (Yu Xintian ed., 3d series (2002)).
67 FREDERICK MATHEWSON DENNY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 122 (4th ed.
2011).
6 See, e.g., DAVID EDWIN LONG, THE HAJJ TODAY: A SURVEY OF THE
CONTEMPORARY MAKKAH PILGRIMAGE 11 (1979); F.E. PETERS, THE HAJJ: THE
MUSLIM PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA AND THE HOLY PLACES, at xxi (1994).
69 MUSA 0. A. ABDUL, ISLAM AS A RELIGION: (FAITH AND DUTIES), at 74 (3d ed.
1974).
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family."" In addition, one "must be sure of security of life; that
is, that there is nothing on the way, such as war, epidemic, flood,
that can threaten his life."71
The duty to perform the haji rests on the authority of the
Qur'an and the recorded practice of the prophet Muhammad-
sunnah-as these are interpreted by the orthodox schools of
Islamic law.712 Although the Islamic tradition acknowledged the
Abrahamic origins of hajj sites and rituals, the privileged status
that Mecca has historically enjoyed is defended on the basis of
Scriptural evidence found in Surah 3:90-91 declaring that:
The first House of Worship founded for mankind was in Bakka
[Makkah]. Blessed and guidance to mankind. In it are evident
signs, even the Standing Place of Abraham [Maqdm Ibrdhim];
and whoever enters it is safe. And the pilgrimage to the temple
[Hajj] is an obligation due to God from those who are able to
journey there. . . .7
Islam prescribes other spiritual journeys but when these are
not made to Mecca and "fall[ ] outside the designated pilgrimage
season-the last month of the Islamic calendar, Dhu al-Hijjah"-
they are considered "mere 'visits' (ziyaras) that can never
substitute for a hajj no matter how many times they are
repeated."7' According to one scholar, "[no combination of
ziyaras can equal a hajj, even if their destinations include the
prophet's mosque in Medina, the tombs of the most venerated
imams in Iraq and Iran, or the final resting places of the
thousands of saints and martyrs all across Asia and Africa."7
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See LONG, supra note 68.
7 PETERS, supra note 68, at 3-7.
7 LONG, supra note 68, at 3 (alteration in original).
75 ROBERT R. BIANCHI, GUESTS OF GOD: PILGRIMAGE AND POLITICS IN THE
ISLAMIc WORLD 40 (2004).
71 Id. Other scholars have offered a political explanation of Muhammad's choice
of Mecca. According to the renowned Dutch Orientalist and colonial officer whose
views shaped modern pilgrimage policy, the choice was a stroke of political genius
that accomplished many goals simultaneously. By centering his new state in Mecca
(the city he was forced to flee and conquer) instead of Medina (the city that gave him
refuge), Muhammad won over his former enemies and consolidated Islam in Arabia.
He also marshaled resources to launch a united force against the greatest military
powers of his day, the Byzantine and Persian empires. When Muhammad instructed
Muslims to pray in the direction of Mecca rather than Jerusalem, his community
could make a double claim: They could be monotheistic without being Jews or
Christians, and they could be universalistic without ceasing to be Arab. See
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The emergence of Mecca as the pre-eminent sacred city in Islam
is further bolstered by Muhammad's farewell haji performed
there in 632 A.D.-an event that laid the foundation for what
would subsequently be known as the haj rites, a body of
liturgical practices that took between one to two centuries after
the prophet's death to evolve into a definitive form."
Thus, while there are traditions of pilgrimages in other
religious traditions, "the haj [is] . . . in a class by itself."7 8  As
already indicated, it is obligatory, not voluntary, and has to "be
performed in a single location, at a specific time, and in a
prescribed manner."7 9  It is not an exaggeration that "Muslims
view the hajj as the most important of Islam's 'five pillars' and as
the crowning spiritual achievement of their lives." 0 "When
Muslims undertake the hajj," Bianchi explains, "they are
reenacting decisive acts of monotheism's two greatest prophets-
the very first and the very last. The drama reminds pilgrims of
their bonds with Muslims around the world and with the millions
of pilgrims who preceded them over fourteen centuries."8 ' Being
firmly rooted in scripture, combined with an unswerving focus on
a single city, the haj enjoys, as it always did, an "exalted
religious status" that is "distinguished by unparalleled
cosmopolitanism and continuity."82 The Director and Head of
Department of Operation, Planning, Research, and Statistics for
Muslim Pilgrims Welfare Agency in Kano, Nigeria believes that
the "spirit of submission to God" and nourishment of spiritual joy
are among the possible reasons the hajj has acquired this
status.83
Just as in Islam, the image of Christian life on earth as
peregrinatio8 4 has played an important role in Christianity;
however, the meaning and importance of pilgrimage is not
explicit in the Christian religion. Christian pilgrimage tradition
generally G.W.J. Drewes, Snouck Hurgronje and the Study of Islam, 113 BIJDRAGEN
TOT DE TAAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE 1 (1957).
77 See LONG, supra note 68, at 9, 11.
78 BIANCHI, supra note 75, at 39.
7 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 40.
" Kabiru S. Hanga, The Haji Exercise in Nigeria: Challenges, Constraints
and Drawbacks (Feb. 1999), http://maisikeli.com/documents/TheHaji Exercisein
NigeriaFinalDocument.pdf.
84 The English word "pilgrimage" was derived from this Latin term.
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has its origin in the Jewish antecedents where a relatively simple
practice of visiting sites linked to a marvelous event in the life of
an individual Israelite or in the collective history of the
community evolved into an elaborate event culminating in a
sacred journey to Jerusalem.5 But early Christianity was
ambivalent about the Jewish conception of the land as holy, in
part because of the concern that it might encourage the
localization of the divine as well as the internal disagreement
within the tradition on the value of pilgrimage and sacred
geography for the formation of Christian identity and assurance
of salvation. In fact, four different approaches to pilgrimage are
discernible during the formative centuries of Christianity,
namely, "rejection," "apathy," "vacillation," "and adjustment of
one's stance as a result of social relationships, ecclesiastical
crises, or theological controversies."" Jerome articulates one of
these positions when he claims, following Paul, that if God is
present everywhere, then he cannot be restricted to the holy
spaces of Palestine." Similarly, Augustine asserts that believers
were aliens in this world, always journeying regardless of their
actual destination, and that their souls, rather than the physical
Jerusalem, should be understood as God's temple where genuine
hierophany can truly be experienced." Noting that pereginatio
and peregrinus do not always designate a physical journey but
include a sense of spiritual exile and wandering, Augustine
proposed a broader theological system that placed more emphasis
on the spiritual aspects of Christian identity.'
Even theologians who attached some spiritual value to
pilgrimage disagreed on the sites that should be privileged for
encountering the divine. For example, Gregory of Nyssa flatly
rejected the importance of Jerusalem as a pilgrimage site,
promoting instead-like Prophet Oschofa of Nigeria-his own
diocese of Cappadocia. 0 At the same time, Cyril of Jerusalem
sought to elevate Jerusalem relative to Caesarea through
" See Georgia Frank, Pilgrimage, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EARLY
CHRISTIAN STUDIES 826, 826-27 (Susan Ashbrook Harvey & David G. Hunter eds.,
2010).
86 BROURIA BITFON-ASHKELONY, ENCOUNTERING THE SACRED: THE DEBATE ON
CHRISTIAN PILGRIMAGE IN LATE ANTIQUITY 205 (2005).
* Id. at 68-69.
* Id. at 116.
* Id. at 205.
* See id. at 51-57.
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promotion of Jerusalem's holy sites.9' His appeal was to all
Christendom, holding that Christian identity was tied to the
sacred space of Jerusalem." To appreciate what was at stake
during this period, one has to pierce through the veil of
theological rhetoric and place the disagreement in the context of
a complex world of power relations between bishoprics and the
efforts undertaken by bishops to control their congregations. As
Bitton-Ashkelony observes, correctly it seems, "the debate at the
end of the fourth century centered not merely on the religious
function of the holy places but rather on the extent to which a
local leader could build on the local territory of divine grace in
order to transform it into a territory of power."94 The tenor of the
debate may have changed since, but the substantive issue about
the extent to which a contingent practice could be elevated to a
binding theological principle remains unresolved.95 From the
beginning of Christianity and before it became a major cultural
presence in Nigeria, Christianity has never spoken with one
voice on pilgrimage. Local church leaders who resisted its
centralization in Jerusalem were motivated not only by a genuine
belief in the ubiquitous presence of God but also by the
awareness of the social, economic, and political benefits that
would accompany the recognition of a place as a pilgrimage
location. Shrines in Lourdes, Fatima, and the Basilica of the
Virgin of Guadalupe are among the Christian sites that still
compete with Jerusalem for millions of pilgrims every year."
" See id. at 58-61.
92 Id.
9 Id. at 60-61.
94 Id. at 64.
9 Frank, supra note 85, at 830-31.
9 See T. F. Casey, Lourdes, in 8 THE CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AM., NEW CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1031, 1032 (describing Lourdes as "the location of the most popular
Marian shrines in the world[,] ... [attracting] 2 million pilgrims a year"); H. M.
Gillett, Fdtima, in 5 THE CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AM., NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
855, 855-56 (1967) (describing FAtima as "one of the most famous Marian shrines in
the world and the destination of numerous pilgrims"); Shrine of Guadalupe, Catholic
Encyclopedia, Catholic Online, http://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/iew.php?id
=5413 (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (Pilgrimages have been made to [Shrine of
Guadalupe] almost uninterruptedly since 1531-32.").
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II. GOVERNMENT AND PILGRIMAGE: A REWARD FOR GOOD
BEHAVIOR
Modem Nigeria came into existence in 1914 when the
colonial governor-general, Lord Lugard, amalgamated the then
northern and southern protectorates." Before then, and for
much of the colonial period, pilgrimage was largely regarded a
private religious affair, and those who undertook it did so as an
act of piety that justified the huge personal sacrifice and
financial expenditure committed to it.9" Not surprisingly,
pilgrimage received minimal, if any, emphasis in the doctrinal
teachings of both foreign and local Christian missionaries, and it
remained a dormant aspect of the Church's devotional life until
the early 1980s.9' Among Muslims for whom pilgrimage is a
doctrinal requirement, official meddling was virtually non-
existent or was mitigated by contextual constraints where it was
found. In fact, until the advent of modern transportation
facilities, only few Muslims were able to make the half by land
routes to Mecca, and among these few were local rulers who went
not as representatives of political kingdoms but in their
capacities as believers.100 To the extent that we can speak of
official policy on pilgrimage in precolonial Nigeria, it was one of
benign indifference. Religion in general, and pilgrimage in
particular, enjoyed relative independence from political
manipulation, even if those who managed the affairs of the
various kingdoms were expected to be religiously attuned as a
matter of cultural legitimacy.'0 '
Colonialism changed the paradigm of jurisdictional
autonomy that had characterized religious life and practice,
though it would be an exaggeration to blame outside intrusion for
all of Nigeria's contemporary ills. Yet, there is some justification
in the claim that "[clontentious issues in the Nigerian State and
Constitution are traceable to Nigeria's colonial history and
97 See MICHAEL CROWDER, A SHORT HISTORY OF NIGERIA 241 (rev. ed. 1966).
98 See 0. E. Tangban, The Haj and the Nigerian Economy 1960-1981, at 21 J.
RELIGION AFR. 241, 242 (1991).
9 Id. at 242.
100 Dunama, the second Muslim king of Kanem in northeastern Nigeria, was
said to have performed the haji three times during his reign in the twelfth century.
He died in the Read Sea during his third pilgrimage. Id.
101 See E. A. AYANDELE, THE MISSIONARY IMPACT ON MODERN NIGERIA 1842-
1914: A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 159-60 (1967); J. F. ADE AJAYI, CHRISTIAN
MISSIONS IN NIGERIA 1841-189 1: THE MAKING OF A NEW ELITE 116 (1965).
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promises to remain an aspect of future Nigerian politics." 02
Much has been written about the system of indirect rule imposed
by the colonial government which involved, in some significant
ways, restrictions on religious proselytizing across regional
boundaries.o3  The government's justification for this
arrangement was to allow maximum freedom for each religion in
the area where it was dominant-Christianity in the south and
Islam in the north-while also reducing any incidents of inter-
religious conflicts and the attendant disruption of political order
to the barest minimum.o' But the paternalism undergirding this
cuius regio, eius religio principle'05 was anything but benevolent;
the public face of religion and the ordering of its internal life are
now subject to government regulations, and the interests of the
state, not of religion, determine what kinds of regulations to
impose.106
The official policy on pilgrimage during this period
illustrates the precarious position of religion.10 7  After their
conquest and reconstitution of the Sokoto Caliphate, the spiritual
headquarters of Nigerian Muslims, the colonial government did
not encourage pilgrimage, fearing that the contact with the wider
Islamic world that pilgrimage afforded would spur resistance
sentiments in the pilgrims when they returned home.108  This
was a period of intense reform and anti-colonial, even jihad,
activities in many Muslim societies-notably Sudan, the pathway
for many Nigerian pilgrims-so the colonial government had
102 Kelechi A. Kalu, Constitutionalism in Nigeria: A Conceptual Analysis of
Ethnicity and Politics, http://voiceofthepeoplenigeria.com/Nigeria-CountryProfile/
Nigeria Constitution.php (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
103See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, NIGERIA: BACKGROUND TO NATIONALISM 51-54
(1960).
10' See 0. U. Kalu, Christianity and Colonial Society, in THE HISTORY OF
CHRISTIANITY IN WEST AFRICA 182-86 (0. U. Kalu ed., 1980).
10I This principle, which literally translates as "whose realm, his religion,"
meaning the religion of the ruler dictated the religion of the ruled, was one of the of
resolutions in the Peace of Augsburg, which ended armed conflict between Catholic
and Protestant forces in the Holy Roman Empire. See STEVEN OZMENT, THE AGE OF
REFORM 1250-1550: AN INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF LATE MEDIEVAL
AND REFORMATION EUROPE 259, 338 (1980).
106 See A.E. Afigbo, Christian Missions and Secular Authorities in South-Eastern
Nigeria from Colonial Times, in THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN WEST AFRICA,
supra note 104, at 187, 188-89.
'0 See Tangban, supra note 98, at 246.
10o See BIANCHI, supra note 75, at 213-20.
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reason to be concerned.o9 Those who led these movements
tended to have a religious re-awakening after visiting Mecca and
Medina not just for the haJj but also to study, and "such student
pilgrims sometimes carried a spirit of Islamic revivalism back to
their homelands."' 0 "In the 1950s however, with the impending
independence of Sudan (1956), the close educational links
between Sudan and Northern Nigeria, and the well-established
relationship with the traditional leadership class in [the region],
the British [colonial government] came to regard the pilgrimage
as less threatening.""' This lead to a policy reversal in a way
that stripped pilgrimage of its religious essence: It was now seen
as a major reward for the "good behavior" of Northern Emirs."2
Of course, what counts as good behavior is almost always what
benefits the state. Successive governments in post-colonial
Nigeria have retained this patrimonial principle, conditioning
their interaction with virtually every sphere of civil society upon
the surrendering of the right to critical vigilance in exchange for
the largesse of the state."'
"Pilgrimage as a reward" has grown beyond the lifting of
travel restrictions to an all-inclusive package of government
generosity, at both federal and state levels, that has at its core
the establishment in 2006 of the National Hajj Commission of
Nigeria (the "NAHCON"), the Nigerian Christian Pilgrims
Commission, and similar bodies in each of the thirty-six states of
the federation." 4 The legal status and functions of the two
commissions are essentially similar, so a focus on one of them
would suffice for this Article's purpose. The NAHCON is
administered by a chairman and nine other members, three of
109 Nehemia Levtzion & John 0. Voll, Introduction to EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
RENEWAL AND REFORM IN ISLAM 3, 8 (Nehemia Levtzion & John 0. Voll eds., 1987).
no Levtzion & Voll, supra note 109.
n JOHN N. PADEN, AHMADU BELLO SARDAUNA OF SOKOTO: VALUES AND
LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA 280 (1986).
112 Id.
113 See Agbaje, supra note 24, at 299-300.
114 These separate Commissions were preceded by a common Nigerian Pilgrims
Board serving both Muslim and Christian constituencies, and their state equivalents
were known as Pilgrims Welfare Boards. The first of such boards was established by
the Western Regional Government of Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1958. See H. 0.
Danmole, The Religious Factor in Nigerian Politics: Awolowo and the Muslims,
1957-1983, in OBAFEMI AWOLOWO: THE END OF AN ERA? 874, 886-87 (Olasope 0.
Oyelaran et al. eds., 1988).
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whom are on full-time appointment and the others part-time."'
The Nigerian President not only appoints the chairman, but he
also designates which members "are to serve on [a] full time
basis and those that are to serve on [a] part-time basis.""e The
government pays the chairman and the NAHCON's members
"such remuneration and allowances as the President may from
time to time determine," and determines eligibility for
participation in the government pension program."' Also serving
on the NAHCON are representatives from each of the following
government ministries: Aviation, Foreign Affairs, Internal
Affairs (Immigration), Finance, Health, and Central Bank of
Nigeria."' There are twelve enumerated functions of the
NAHCON, the most pertinent of which is the oversight
responsibility for "organizing and coordinating the movement of
persons from Nigeria to Saudi Arabia," "[piroviding
accommodation, transportation, and other services related to the
performance of the Hajj and Umra," "[coordinating] the provision
of health, financial, security, customs, immigration and related
services," "establishment and management of pilgrims camps and
related facilities, equipment and such other necessary materials,"
"conduct[ing] educative and enlightenment campaigns on Hajj
and Umra, in all the States of the Federation, and the Federal
Capital Territory," and "regulat[ing] and control[ling] in and
outside [of] Nigeria all matters concerning the welfare of
Nigerian pilgrims.""'
Although each individual pilgrim, Muslim or Christian, is
expected to pay his or her way to the Holy Land, only few
actually do so because of the subsidies provided by the federal
and state governments.'2 0 The state governments are especially
known for engaging in competition as to which of them is most
generous in funding pilgrimages.121 Earlier this year, the
us National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) (Establishment) Act No. (9)
(2006) 93:66 S.O.G., A329 § 3(1)(a)-(b).
n6 Id. § 3(2)-(3).
117 Id. §§ 3(4), 4(2)(a)-(c), 10(1).
us Id. § 3(1)(c).
119 Id. § 4(1).
120 See generally Pat Williams, Religious Groups and the Politics ofNational
Development in Nigeria, 7 RESEARCH REV. 32, 40-42 (1991), available at http://
archive.1ib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Institue%20of%20African%2OSt
udies%20Research%20Review/1991v7nl&2/asrvOO7001&2005.pdf.
121 See Chentu Dauda Nguvugher, Nigerian Religious Pilgrimages: Piety or
Economic Waste?, TCNN RES. BULL., March 2011, at 4, available at
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Zamfara state government in the North proudly reported that it
"had approved free feeding of its pilgrims during their five days'
[sic] stay in Munna and Mountain Arafat in an effort to subsidise
expenses and provide good food for the pilgrims."122 The
government of Oyo State in the West gestured a similar posture
at the recent inauguration ceremony of the Pilgrims Welfare
Board (Christian Wing), promising that pilgrims to the holy land
will not be neglected, and that "when the welfare of people on
pilgrimage to Jerusalem will be mentioned nationwide, Oyo State
will receive an unrivaled mention and celebration." 1 23
Considering that Muslims and Christians are only a part of
the Nigerian population, admittedly a substantial part,' and
that not all Nigerians are religious, it is necessary to ask whether
these extensive involvements of the government are justified in
light of the relevant religion provisions in the Nigerian
Constitution.
III. ASSESSING STATE SPONSORSHIP OF PILGRIMAGES
IN NIGERIA
Of the three religion provisions already identified,"' it is the
non-adoption and the non-discrimination norms that offer the
greatest challenge to the government policy and practice of
sponsoring pilgrims to the Holy Lands. The Free Exercise Clause
does not appear to be offended by the government's supervision of
and participation in the pilgrmage exercises, not only because of
the inclusive conceptualization of religious freedom in the
Nigerian Constitution as encompassing the freedom "to
http://www.tcnn.org/index-files/rb54.chentu.htm; see also 2010 Haji: Zamfara
Remits N1b to NHCN, NIGERIAN TRIBUNE (July 2, 2010), http://www.tribune.com.ng/
index.php/news/7708-2010-hajj--zamfara-remits-nlb-to-nhcn [hereinafter 2010 Haj]
(discussing the extreme spending on religious pilgrimages by the government of the
northern state of Zamfara and describing their pride in those pilgrimages).
122 2010 Hai, supra note 121.
123 No Oyo Pilgrim Will Suffer Neglect-Ajimobi, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Oct.
13, 2011), http://dailyindependentnigeria.com/2011/10/13/no-oyo-pilgrim-will-suffer-
neglect-%E2%80%93-ajimobi.
124 Census is a notoriously controversial subject in Nigeria, especially when it
concerns religious data; however, Christians and Muslims are estimated to make up
forty percent and fifty percent, respectively, of the population. See Nigeria:
International Religious Freedom Report 2008, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irfl2008/108385.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
125 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), §§ 10, 38, 41(1), 42, available at
http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
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manifest. . . [one's] religion or belief in worship, teaching,
practice and observance," 26 but also because the Constitution
construes this right as an entitlement that citizens have rather
than as a restraint against the government.127  Unlike the
language of the Free Exercise Clause in the U.S. Constitution,
which imposes a restraint on the government regarding the
permissible scope of its action toward religion-a negative right
construction' 2 8 -the construction of the right in the Nigerian
context is in positive language. The difference between the two
approaches is that positive rights "require other people to act
positively-to 'do -something-whereas . . . [negative rights]
require other people merely to refrain from acting in certain
ways-to do nothing that violates the rights."29 While one
presumably confers benefits, the import of the other is to prevent
harm. So conceived, it is no wonder that Nigerian Muslims and
Christians see the involvement of their government in pilgrimage
as a logical entailment of their constitutional right.130
Fulfillment of the right is more than simply granting a normative
space or a value zone within which people of different faiths and
of no faith can carry out the dictates of their conscience. It
includes the provision of what is necessary for-that is, financial
and bureaucratic support-or the removal of any obstacles, such
as financial handicaps, against compliance with these dictates.' 3 '
This interpretation would be unproblematic but for the other
two strictures imposed by the constitution on the conduct of the
government. The first bars the government from adopting any
religion as state religion.132  The key word here is "adopt,"
ordinarily synonymous with the words "affiliate, embrace,
choose, select, elect, assume, [and] approriate" and understood to
mean, inter alia, "to take or receive as one's own (that which is
not so naturally)," "to choose and follow." 3 Thus, what has to be
126 Id. § 38.
127 Id.
128 CONST. amend. I.
129 HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 36 (2d ed. 1996).
120 See generally Yushau Sodiq, Can Muslims and Christians Live Together
Peacefully in Nigeria?, 99 THE MUSLIM WORLD 646, 672-74 (2009).
'3' Id. at 673.
132 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 10, available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
1sa WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRDIGED DICTIONARY 26 (Deluxe 2d. 1983).
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determined is whether government provision of funds and other
forms of assistance toward pilgrimages constitute an adoption of
religion within the meaning of the Nigerian Constitution. Since
the Nigerian courts have yet to consider this question, it might
be useful to seek guidance from pronouncements from other
jurisdictions facing similar problems. One pervasive concern in
establishment litigation in the United States is the degree of
134
assistance governments may offer to religious organizations.
Typically, this has involved financial aid to religious groups that
supply services that nonreligious organizations also provide, such
as hospitals, adoption agencies, soup kitchens, and parochial
schools. In each of these cases, the ultimate beneficiaries of the
aid or assistance are either the clients served by the agencies or
the students who attend parochial schools, and not the religious
organizations themselves, although they function as
intermediaries through which the objects of the aid are
transmitted. The constitutionality of such aid has often hinged
on this distinction between the beneficiaries and the
administrators of the aid.135 The defining characteristic of the
former is their status as citizens whose needs are legitimated by
their grammar of membership in a political society. While the
aid administrators share this common identity of citizenship, it is
also within their democratic right to rely upon and be public
about their religious values when they seek to participate in
society through various avenues of service. The only caveat is
that political-participation-through-service cannot become a
pretext for religious proselytization."'
This argument is at the heart of the three-pronged Lemon
test, under which a challenged law or policy is valid only if it
(1) has a secular legislative purpose, (2) does not have a primary
effect that advances or inhibits religion, and (3) does not foster
"an excessive government entanglement with religion."m1 3
Despite a sustained judicial onslaught against the Lemon test,
the Supreme Court has not explicitly renounced it, nor has it
134 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT
AND FAIRNESS 352-53 (2008).
135 Id. at 360-63.
* Id. at 385-432.
'n Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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officially been replaced by any other tests.'3 8 On the contrary, its
elements are routinely invoked by jurists and, as one scholar
observes, "cases decided under Lemon are treated as
authoritative."'" While the Nigerian Supreme Court is not
bound by the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court or its
pronouncements on the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause, it seems reasonable to suppose that similar
considerations will bear on the Nigerian Supreme Court and its
subordinate courts when dealing with the Non-Adoption Clause
in Section 10 of the Constitution. More importantly, the
elements of the test resonate with the prevailing sentiments in
Nigeria about how to resolve the quandary of religion-state
interactions.
Of the three, it is the first element of the Lemon test that
Nigerians would find most controversial to use in assessing
the constitutional propriety of government involvement in
pilgrimage. The disagreement is not likely to be about "purpose,"
whether this denotes "the actual aims of those who perform an
action, their 'subjective' purposes or aims, or . .. some more
objective standard of the significance of what the actors have
performed"140 but rather about what the secular nature of the
purpose connotes. Two standard sociological conceptualizations
of secularity are worth retrieving here. The term was initially
understood to mean "the retreat of religion from various public
spaces: politics, science, art, [and] the market," but later
expanded to include "the notion of declining religious belief and
practice, often thought to be an inevitable consequence of
modernity."141 In a society where this marginalized status of
religion has become an empirical fact,14 2 a purpose that is secular
would be one that reflects the character of that society. This
hardly matches the picture of Nigeria's social and cultural
reality. The country's more than 130 million inhabitants are
almost equally divided between Islam and Christianity, with a
tiny minority-about ten percent-claiming to be adherents of
13 GREENAWALT, supra note 134, at 160.
13 Id. at 161.
140 GREENAWALT, supra note 134, at 164.
141 VARIETIES OF SECULARISM IN A SECULAR AGE 8 (Michael Warner et al. eds.,
2010).
142 For a view suggesting that the modern West typifies such a society, see
LAMIN SANNEH, ENCOUNTERING THE WEST: CHRISTIANITY AND THE GLOBAL
CULTURAL PROCESS: THE AFRICAN DIMENSION 47-57 (1993).
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the traditional religion or of no religion.'4 3 It is in light of this
breakdown that many Nigerians, Muslims, and Christians alike
dismiss the characterization of Nigeria as a secular state on the
basis of the Non-Adoption Clause in Section 10 of the
Constitution. '
The obvious reason for objecting to secularity is its
inadequate description of Nigeria and its people, but suspicion
about the term is much deeper. A secular state or a secularly
motivated purpose, it is feared, will be callously indifferent 4 5 or
even blatantly hostile to religion which, if permitted, would
exacerbate Nigeria's problems of moral disorientation."' A
Nigerian Roman Catholic theologian deems extreme a policy of
"[an impenetrable judicial wall of separation between church
and state" and ridicules those who would support it as insane
who have no interest in "the survival of the nation."" The
threat to the social health of Nigeria is not religion but
secularity, evident in the chronic vices of "moral depravity,
corruption, oppression, infidelity and syncretism,"us which can be
cured, according to a Muslim judge, "only by divine injunctions
backed by those who govern."149  On this reasoning, it is not
enough simply to provide for the free exercise of religion; the
state must also accommodate religious beliefs and practices in its
legislative process and policy formulations.
" See Frieder Ludwig, Christian-Muslim Relations in Northern Nigeria Since
the Introduction of Shari'ah in 1999, 76 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 602, 603 (2008).
1" See David D. Laitin, The Sharia Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second
Republic, 20 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 411, 413, 419 (1982).
"I Andrew Koppelman identifies callous indifference as one of the four
objections to the secular purpose doctrine. The other three are the rubber stamp
objection, which "holds that nearly anything can satisfy the secular purpose
requirement, because a secular rationale can be imagined for almost any law"; the
evanescence objection, which claims "the 'purpose' that the rule seeks either does not
exist or is not knowable by judges"; and the participation objection, which suggests
that "the rule makes religious people into second-class citizens by denying them the
right to participate in the legislative process." See Andrew Koppelman, Secular
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 88-89 (2002).
"4 See Sam Amadi, Religion and Secular Constitution: Human Rights and the
Challenge of Sharia 10-11 (Oct. 25, 2004) (unpublished research report paper on file
with the Harvard Kennedy School Carr Center for Human Rights Policy), available
at http://content.hks.harvard.edu/carr/cchrp/researchlreports.php.
147 IKEM B. C. B. NGWOKE, RELIGION AND RELI3IOuS LIBERTY IN NIGERIAN LAW:
FROM THE COLONIAL DAYS TO 1983, at 140 (1984).
14 SULAIMAN, supra note 29, at 3.
149 Justice Bashire Sambo, Draft Constitution Fails to Provide for Morality, NEW
NIGERIAN, Jan. 5, 1977, at 7.
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What remains unclear from the argument of the opponents
of a secular purpose doctrine is whether government funding
of pilgrimage is a permissible accommodation of religion.
Understood as "an area of allowable and, in some cases,
compelled governmental deference to the religious needs of
people holding a variety of beliefs,"5 0 the concept of
accommodation is a free exercise, not an establishment, doctrine.
As such, it calls for "a delicate balance between [a] government's
duty to promote the cohesiveness necessary for an ordered society
and its responsibility to honor the religious practices of citizens
by refraining from unnecessary or burdensome regulation."'
Were the Nigerian government to proscribe pilgrimage, it would
clearly be imposing unnecessary and burdensome regulation on
its overwhelmingly religious population, thereby abridging that
population's constitutional rights. However, the government's
current mode of intervention in pilgrimage affairs is not
proscription, but rather positive assistance, and justifying this
gesture under the rubric of accommodation stretches the
meaning of the term beyond its legitimate bound. Such a
subversive application of accommodation offers a recipe for
"heightened civil strife, corruption of religion, and oppression of
religious minorities."5 2
It can be argued that the Nigerian government's sponsorship
of pilgrimage-like other instances of its "appeasement of
religion,"'53 such as the state funding of a national mosque and a
Christian ecumenical center-is responsible for the perception
that the Nigerian state "is not simply a policy-producing
mechanism balancing different notions of equality against each
other,"'5 4 but is "itself the greatest prize and resource, over which
groups engage in a continuing struggle .... It is also a
distributor of resources, which is nearly always done
differentially."115  As is often the case when free money is
available, it does not matter that the largesse would be spent on
frivolous projects or peripheral religious values. This is clearly
150 ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 58
(1990).
.. Id. at 58-59.
152 Koppelman, supra note 145, at 88.
's AMADI, supra note 146, at 13 (emphasis omitted).
" ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE STATE 9 (Paul Brass ed., 1985).
1s5 Id. at 29.
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the case with the Nigerian Christian elevation of pilgrimage to
an important ritual practice. The former head of the Anglican
Church in Nigeria, Archbishop Peter Akinola, admitted that
"pilgrimage is unimportant in Christianity," but he justified his
push for government sponsorship because "it was a vital step
toward equality with Muslims. "156 Interestingly, Muslim
politicians welcomed a resurgent Christian interest in pilgrimage
because they hoped it would force Christians to "abandon their
strict interpretations of secularism"157 since they now benefit
from the same sort of aid the state had provided to Islam.
For both Christian and Muslim groups, pilgrimage has
become less a matter of complying with a religious injunction
than an avenue for political patronage.5 8 Their politicization of
this ritual-which they wrongly believe is warranted by the
principle of accommodation-also reveals their lukewarm
commitment to the principle of religious disestablishment and
the vision of living in a state where no religion is adopted as a
state religion. Neither side seems bothered by the demand of
equity imposed by the pluralistic nature of Nigeria's religious
composition.'5 9  The justification for government support of
pilgrimages offered by Christians-to achieve political parity
with Muslims-ignores the fact that there are also Nigerians who
adhere to the traditional religion and religions other than
Christianity and Islam or to no religion at all and who do not
receive similar funding from the government. 6 0  Similarly, the
non-strict interpretations of secularity proposed by the Muslims
and some Pentecostal Christians would only strengthen the
already problematic ties between religion and the state, the kind
of effect that Lemon fears would advance religion and foster an
excessive entanglement between two functionally separate
institutions.161
116 BIANCHI, supra note 75, at 214.
'7 Id. at 213.
"' See id.
159 See id. at 214-16.
160 See Idumange John, Nigeria: Abolish State Sponsorships of Pilgrimages,
SAHARA REP. (Feb. 02, 2010, 1:00), http://www.saharareporters.com/article/nigeria-
abolish-state-sponsorship-pilgrimages.
161 See Lisa Newton, Divine Sanction and Legal Authority: Religion and the
Infrastructure of the Law, in RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 179-200 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988).
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But funding is not the only way in which pilgrimages enjoy
the support of the state. As already indicated, various
government ministries and personnel, including state governors,
are involved in their planning and operation, sometimes
accompanying pilgrims to the ritual sites.6 2 The government is
also responsible for the recruitment and compensation of the
Pilgrim Commissions' staff at both federal and state levels.'e In
addition, government buildings and web portals are used not just
for disseminating logistical information about pilgrimages, but
also for teaching about their spiritual benefits.'" This explicit
association of the accouterments of government with religious
affairs raises their social significance and extends their influence
beyond the ambit of spirituality. However, complaints about the
misuse of public money would do a poor job of capturing what is
constitutionally troublesome about this manner of government
involvement in pilgrimages. To see the relevant harm here, it
will be helpful to briefly review how the U.S. Supreme Court has
intervened in other cases of establishment litigation involving
public exhibitions of religious symbols, such as the cr~ches, the
Ten Commandments, and so forth.
The locus classicus for thinking about the constitutional
quagmire arising from public display or affirmation of religious
symbols is the endorsement test developed by Justice O'Connor
in the Court's very first holiday display case, Lynch v.
162 See National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) (Establishment) Act
No. (9) (2006) 93:66 S.O.G A330 4.
16, See generally Nguvugher, supra note 121.
164 The Edo State government advertises the following as the benefits of
Christian pilgrimage:
1. To experience firsthand the land where our faith was born.
2. To connect us . .. more intimately to our Christian faith.
3. To grow in the deepest understanding of the scriptures.
4. It points us back to the miracles of Christ, e.g. at Cana of Galilee, you
will remember where Jesus turned water to wine; at Bethany, you will
recall the miraculous raising of Lazarus from the dead.
5. It brings spiritual renewal and revival. The sacred places you will see[,]
enter[,} and pray will help to renew your encounter with God and your
experience with Him will become more intense than ever.
6. Holy Living: The exercise affects lives morally and spiritually. This
builds up holiness because the Christian life is a call to holy living.
7. To witness the miraculous restoration of the nation of Israel[.]
Information on Edo State Christian Pilgrims Welfare Board, Benin City, EDO
STATE, http://www.edostate.gov.ng/christian-pilgrims-welfare-board (last visited
Oct. 18, 2011).
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Donnelly."' Lynch involved the display by the city of Pawtucket,
Rhode Island, of a nativity scene or cr~che in a park owned by a
nonprofit organization and located in the city's shopping
district.16 6 Justice O'Connor said that the crucial question was
whether the display amounted to an endorsement of religion, or
of a particular religion:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community. Government can run afoul
of that prohibition ... [by its] endorsement or disapproval of
religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.'67
There are several advantages of using this test for the
discussion of the pilgrimage palaver in Nigeria over the elements
furnished by the Lemon test. First, it avoids language that
significant segments of the Nigerian population find offensive to
their moral and religious sensibilities, notwithstanding that
their understandings of secularity or a secular purpose are
theoretically stale and jejune." In his recent monumental book,
Charles Taylor offers a more adequate account of secularity,
which he claims refers not merely to the dwindling of religion or
even the functional separation of religion from state, science, and
aesthetics."6 ' For Taylor, the term connotes "a move from a
society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed,
unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option
among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace."7 0
Therefore, secularity is not just a net reduction in religious belief
or practice, but also a change in the very conditions of belief."'
"Secularity in this sense," Taylor writes, "is a matter of the whole
context of understanding in which our moral, spiritual[,] or
religious experience and search takes place."'7 2
" 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 671 (majority opinion).
167 Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1" Laitin, supra note 144, at 425.
169 CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 3 (2007).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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Taylor's account of secularity is compatible with the main
thrust of the endorsement test, which leads to the second
advantage of the test, namely, an emphasis on disparagement as
the relevant injury suffered when government publicly endorses
religious symbols. The injury arises because of what seems to be
an utter disregard for what Taylor calls "the whole context"
that shapes religious belief, experience, and practice.17 3  In a
pluralistic context like Nigeria, the injury of being disparaged as
a religious outsider can have repercussions beyond this sphere,
including possibly determining whether one has a materially
meaningful life or not. Preventing this injury or mitigating its
effects then requires a rehabilitation of the most dormant of the
religion clauses in the Nigerian Constitution, the Non-
Discrimination Clause and its associated norm of equal liberty.
This is another advantage for using the endorsement test. The
intended goal of the test is impartiality in the way that citizens of
a religiously pluralistic society are treated such that no one
would have any reasons to consider himself or herself superior or
inferior to others solely on the basis of religious identity.
But why should anyone be concerned about being
discriminated against or disparaged on the basis of religion? An
answer to this question has to be sought in what Eisgruber and
Sager call the "four structural features of religion" and their
effects on "the social meaning of religious displays."'7 4 The
features are: (1) the comprehensiveness of religions-"large,
expansive webs of belief and conduct"; (2) the tendency of
religions to classify people as insiders and outsiders and
sometimes undergirding the classifications with strict
enforcement rules; (3) the reinforcing role of religious rituals, for
example, pilgrimage, "in signifying who is 'in' or 'out' of these
comprehensive structures"; and (4) the fact that "the perceived
173 Id.
174 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 34, at 125.
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stakes of being within or without these structures of belief and
membership are often momentous."7 The upshot of this
analysis is that because
religion plays a major role in defining civic identity.... [Plublic
endorsements of religion carry a special charge or valence.
Such endorsements signify who is 'in' and 'out' of competing
large-scale social and ideological structures, and assign
powerful and pervasive judgments of identity and stature to the
status of being in or out. Religious endorsements valorize some
religious beliefs and those who hold them, and thereby
disparage those who do not share those beliefs.7
This is what is at stake in the unabashed involvement of the
Nigerian government in pilgrimages. By lending the imprimatur
of the state behind these ritual events, the government makes a
preferential option for members of the two dominant religions in
the country and treats as outcasts members of other religions or
of no religions, as well as members of the favored religions for
whom pilgrimage is a low priority requirement. Christians who
return from pilgrimages acquire the title of J.P. or Jerusalem
Pilgrim, which they proudly put in front of their names, and their
Muslim counterparts are referred to as Alhajis, or Alhajas if they
are women."'7 7  These are designations that literally and
symbolically enhance the social prestige of the bearers, providing
them with a unique advantage to access and manipulate
Nigeria's complex networks of political and economic power.17a
To stem the current tide, political and legal debate may have to
be moved from the domains of the Non-Adoption and Free
Exercise Clauses and relocated at the heart of the Non-
Discrimination Clause with its impartiality and equal liberty
principles. As the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Abuja and the
immediate past Chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria
1" Id. For a different account and much longer list of important features of
religion, see Robert Audi, Liberal Democracy and Religion in Politics, in ROBERT
AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQuARE: THE PLACE OF
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE 1, 5 (1997).
176 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 34, at 126.
177 See Christopher Steed & David Westerlund, Nigeria, in ISLAM OUTSIDE THE
ARAB WORLD 56, 73 (David Westerlund and Ingvar Svangberg eds., 1999).
178 Id.; JEFF HAYNES, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA 79-103 (1996); DONAL
B. CRUISE O'BRIEN, SYMBOLIC CONFRONTATIONS: MUSLIMS IMAGINING THE STATE IN
AFRICA 1-29 (2003).
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rightly put it, "as long as there are pilgrimage commissions and
for as long as government continues to support some pilgrimages,
it must necessarily face the challenge of equity and fairness. "1
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the tendency by scholars to
focus exclusively on the Non-Adoption and Free Exercises
Clauses in the Nigerian constitution as adequate mechanisms for
the protection of the country's religious pluralism and the secular
character of the state is mistaken. It contends that existing
interpretations of both clauses have encouraged rigid ideological
positions among religious and non-religious partisans and have
failed to grasp the real nature of the moral hazards that are
inherent in a religiously pluralistic society. The Article thus
argues that a more adequate test for determining the extent to
which the Nigerian Constitution takes cognizance of the
country's religious pluralism is its articulation of the norms for
opposing inequality and discrimination among the citizens. By
examining the involvement of the Nigerian government, at both
the federal and state levels, in religious pilgrimages, the Article
demonstrates the precarious status of these norms and the
imperative to defend their lexical priority over the other
constitutional provisions on religion.
17 John Onaiyekan, Dividends of Religion in Nigeria: Public Lecture at
the University of Ilorin 23 (May 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http-//www.unilorin.edu.ng/publiclectures/Unilorin%20DIVIDENDS%200F%20REL
IGION%20IN%20NIGERIA%202.doc.
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